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Mental Representations of Values
and Behaviors
Gabriel Lins De Holanda Coelho1,2 , Paul H. P. Hanel1,3,4 ,
Mark K. Johansen1 and Gregory R. Maio1,3
Abstract
The present research provides the first direct assessment of the fit of diverse behaviors to putatively related personal
and social values from Schwartz’s theory. Across three studies, we examined spatial representations of value-related
behaviors that were explicitly derived from people’s mental representations of the values. Participants were asked how
similar the behaviors were to each other and various values, and these judgments were used to specify multidimensional
scaling solutions. The results indicated that the spatial representation of the behaviors was consistent with the two-
dimensional space described in Schwartz’s model of values, although several deviations occurred. For example, self-
enhancement behaviors were widely spread, indicating more variation in the way individuals interpret these behaviors,
which are often associated with other value types. These data provide evidence that a range of behaviors can at least
partly be reduced to underlying motivations expressed by values. Furthermore, our findings indicate that behaviors are
often expressed by several values, which might help to explain why value–behavior associations in previous studies were
weak. Finally, they illustrate a new approach to learning which behaviors might relate to multiple values.
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The link between values and behaviors is axiomatic
in a range of real-world contexts. For instance,
the Department for Education in Britain has empha-
sized the importance of teaching of British values,
including democracy, law, liberty, and mutual respect
and tolerance, allowing students to challenge opin-
ions or behaviors that oppose these principles
(Adams, 2014). Similarly, the G20 group of nations
recently initiated annual Values (“V20”) summits
to explicitly consider common values among the
G20 nations and the actions they express (https://
values20.org/).
These assumptions about the importance of values
are reinforced by research examining connections
between values and behaviors (Bardi & Schwartz,
2003; Boer & Fischer, 2013; Lee et al., in press;
Rokeach, 1973; Skimina et al., 2019). For instance,
values significantly predict attitudes toward immi-
grants and political activism (Schwartz, 2007). Even
research on artificial intelligence has examined values
and behavior: When reading stories, an artificial intel-
ligence can learn about the culture where the story is
originated (Riedl & Harrison, 2016). However,
similar to conceptually related constructs in social
psychology (e.g., personality traits, attitudes; Maio
et al., 2018), the associations between values and
behaviors depend on myriad contextual factors.
Also, values may be used as rationalizations of
behavior after the fact (Eiser, 1987; Haidt, 2001;
Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Maio, 2016).
Furthermore, despite the long-standing interest in
value–behavior connections, empirical studies of
these connections are far fewer than one might
expect (Fischer, 2017).
One explanation for this paucity is the complexity
of value–behavior connections. Multiple values may
influence any given behavior, and single values may
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influence a multitude of behaviors. In addition,
these links may occur across varied situations
(Schwartz, 1992). Consider behaviors related to the
value of freedom. This value can be expressed as
behaviors when animal-rights activists are trying to
save animals trapped in zoos or circuses or when citi-
zens strive for a region’s independence from a per-
ceived occupier. However, behaviors in both
examples can also be expressions of additional
values: Saving animals may also help protect the envi-
ronment or even wealth (through loss of animal-
related tourism). Also, regional independence may
be perceived as a threat to values of peace or national
security. Thus, a key problem in examining the inter-
relations between values and behaviors is the difficul-
ty of conceptually linking specific values to specific
behaviors.
To help decompose this complex problem, the pre-
sent research introduces the direct mapping of
relations between values and behaviors. More specif-
ically, we asked participants to judge the similarity
between specific values and behaviors, thereby pro-
viding their mental representations (i.e., the charac-
terization of an object within a cognitive system;
Hubbard, 2007). For instance, one might think of
donating money to charity as a behavior guided by
social justice. However, others might think of it as an
act promoting social recognition. Thus, our approach
allows the mapping of diverse putative interconnec-
tions between values and a range of specific behav-
iors, identifying which behaviors are conceptually
close to which values and how their relations can be
better assessed.
Theory of Basic Human Values
Schwartz’s (1992, 2012) value model, which has
received empirical support in over 80 countries,
arranges values in a two-dimensional spatial represen-
tation (see Figure 1). This circular organization
covers basic motivations expressed through 57 value
items. In the original model (Schwartz, 1992), 10
motives are delineated (see Figure 1) as the 10 value
types; in turn, these 10 types can be ordered along two
dimensions, resulting in four higher order value types.
The first dimension contrasts openness to change with
conservation motives. The second dimension contrasts
self-enhancement with self-transcendence motives.
A core feature of Schwartz’s (1992) model is its
inclusion of motivational synergies and conflicts.
Values placed next to each have more compatible
motivations, whereas those further apart are more
incompatible. For example, universalism values are
adjacent to benevolence values, because they repre-
sent and reinforce concern for the welfare of others.
In contrast, achievement and power represent moti-
vations for self-enhancement. This motivational con-
tinuum has important implications for variables
external to the model, including value-relevant behav-
iors. For example, suppose one behavior exhibits a
strong positive correlation with ratings of the impor-
tance of one of the value types. In that case, the model
Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992) Values Structure (Examples of Values in Italic; Reprinted From Coelho, Hanel, Johansen, & Maio, 2018,
With Permission).
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predicts that judgment correlations should become
progressively less positive (and then perhaps nega-
tive), moving around the circular model from adja-
cent value types through orthogonal value types to
opposing value types. This pattern of correlations
corresponds to a sinusoidal wave that increases (cor-
relations between a value type and its adjacent values
are positive), then decreases (correlating with oppos-
ing values are negative), and finally increases again
(completing the circle, returning to the adjacent
values with positive correlations; e.g., Boer &
Fischer, 2013; Hanel, Zacharopoulos, et al., 2017;
Schwartz, 1992). For instance, if individuals who
value stimulation (e.g., an exciting life) are more
likely to engage in activities that require more physi-
cal challenge and danger, the performance of these
activities should become progressively less strongly
linked to values when moving from adjacent self-
direction and hedonism values through to the oppos-
ing values of conformity, security, and tradition
(potentially exhibiting negative relations with these
latter values). However, such sinusoidal patterns do
not always emerge—the type of value itself matters,
particularly in terms of values related behaviors.
Assessing Values and Behaviors
Everyday behaviors associated with values might be
represented in a similar space to their values, but to
varying degrees. For instance, Bardi and Schwartz
(2003) found that correlations between values and
behaviors depend on the value type being examined.
For example, the frequency with which participants
performed behaviors extracted from the value types
of tradition (e.g., observe traditional customs on hol-
idays) and stimulation (e.g., do unconventional
things) was highly correlated with the importance
participants attributed to the behaviors’ respective
values (e.g., devout, a varied life). In contrast, some
values and behaviors deviated from the predictions:
For example, conformity values did not correlate with
their respective behaviors, but correlated with behav-
iors from tradition values, an adjacent value type.
When assessing the correlations between the behav-
iors and the 10 value types, with the 10 value types
plotted on the x-axis and the strength of the correla-
tions on the y-axis, the sine wave fit was worst for
behaviors derived from universalism and benevo-
lence, but was good for all other behaviors, especially
from tradition, stimulation, and hedonism (Hanel,
Zacharopoulos, et al., 2017). In a subsequent project,
Schwartz and Butenko (2014) attempted to map
values and behaviors together. Of the 19 value
types, 18 showed stronger associations with their
respective behaviors than with others. Interestingly,
in both of these studies, the spatial representation
between values and behaviors broadly replicated
Schwartz’s motivational continuum with its
agreement and conflict assumptions (Bardi &
Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).
Notwithstanding the broad support for the model
from these studies, the deviations highlight a critical
obstacle in value–behavior research: the complexity
of selecting value-expressive behaviors. For example,
some behaviors may be more strongly related to other
value types than the value type from which they were
initially derived. In addition, individuals can classify
everyday actions of every sort at different levels of
abstraction (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 2014). For
instance, in the context of Schwartz’s model forgiving
someone who insulted you may be categorized as
forgiveness or more abstractly as “benevolence”
(encompassing forgiveness, helpfulness and other
ideals), or even more abstractly as “self-tran-
scendence” (encompassing universalism values).
These multiple interpretations for specific actions
have been a limitation in psychological studies that
involve human behaviors, because of the variability
across individuals. Therefore, it is important to con-
sider levels of categorization to obtain reliable repre-
sentations of what the actors are doing (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987, 2014).
Value Instantiations: Linking Values and Behaviors
One approach that might help to link values and
behaviors was proposed by Maio (2010, 2016), who
argued that values are mental representations of
ideals that can be examined at three levels: (a) a
system level, which is about the relations of the
values with each other, as in Schwartz’s (1992)
model; (b) an abstract level, in which values are con-
strued in terms of feelings and cognitions across sit-
uations and relating to the importance that
individuals give to abstract value concepts (e.g., plea-
sure, social order); and (c) an instantiation level,
where a value is conceptualized in terms of concrete
judgments and actions specific to situations. In
Maio’s (2010, 2016) system level, individuals may
spontaneously group values in a way that reflects
their experience. For example, consider an individual
who has experienced situations wherein equality was
related to others’ welfare (e.g., fair income distribu-
tion, respect in the workplace for people’s differen-
ces). This individual is likely to group equality with
other values that promote the welfare of others, such
as social justice, helpful, and honest, and more distant
from other values serving opposing motivations, such
as wealth or national security.
At the abstract level, mental representations may
also vary. For example, Aavik and Dobewall (2017)
assessed whether health, defined in Schwartz’s model
as the avoidance of disease, could be more broadly
represented as different types of health (e.g., mental
health, physical health, social health). Using a large
sample (N¼ 1,818), Aavik and Dobewall found that
the health subcomponents were spread across a third
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dimension. These values were not placed in the open-
ness to change versus conservation dimension, nor the
self-enhancement versus self-transcendence, but
rather working together with other value types and
not limited to the location of the original value
(conservation).
At the instantiation level, any value can circum-
scribe numerous behaviors (cf. Kruglanski et al.,
2013), and a priori knowledge about whether a
value can predict a behavior requires knowing
which behaviors are the strongest instantiations of
particular values (Hanel, Vione, et al., 2017). The
importance of this approach is shown in past research
(Maio et al., 2009) that exposed participants to stories
about typical instances of behavior violating the value
of equality (e.g., discrimination against women) or
atypical instances (e.g., discrimination against left-
handed people). Participants who thought about
typical instances exhibited less discrimination in a
subsequent experimental task than participants who
thought about equality in the context of atypical
instances, which did not differ from the control con-
dition. The results supported the hypothesis that the
impact of value instantiations on subsequent behavior
depends on the extent to which the instantiations are
typical exemplars of the value (Maio et al., 2009).
Therefore, it is essential to assess how the connec-
tions between values and behavioral instantiations of
values occur and assess how these instantiations are
mentally represented in connection to the values. In
other words, how does a behavior serve as an instance
of a value? Not using a behavior that is a typical
example of a specific value can result in weak associ-
ations (Maio et al., 2009). One approach that has
been used in value–behavior research is first to ask
individuals of a given culture to provide a list of what
they consider to be typical examples of behaviors of a
set of values (e.g., Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz
& Butenko, 2014). For instance, research in Brazil
indicated that typical behaviors that express the
value of “pleasure” include being on holiday at the
beach or playing football on a Sunday (cf. Hanel
et al., 2018). This approach is the basis for our meth-
ods in the present research.
Conceptual Similarities
Research in cognitive psychology has more frequently
used the direct measurement of perceived conceptual
similarity between items to identify the structure of
mental representations, especially in categorization
tasks (see summaries in Murphy, 2004; Oden, 1987).
In these tasks, judgments of a new example’s similar-
ity to previously known representations (e.g., a single
prototype or a set of examples) can be used as a basis
for predicting the assignment of the instance to cate-
gories. This direct assessment of conceptual represen-
tations has been used in two recent sets of studies, one
re-examining Schwartz’s (1992) value structure
(Coelho et al., 2019), and another (Koch et al.,
2016) improving a model of stereotype content
(Fiske et al., 2002).
When compared to approaches that involve plot-
ting correlations between ratings of constructs (e.g.,
values and behaviors; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003;
Schwartz & Butenko, 2014), the use of similarities
provides an alternative and arguably more fundamen-
tal assessment of the mental representations of values
and behaviors. Direct similarity comparisons are less
likely to be based on personal importance attributed
to the behaviors or their perceived benefits.
Comparisons of similarity focus on the conceptual
understanding of the value or the behavior per se.
Pakizeh et al. (2007) highlight the differences between
these conceptual similarities and value importance
judgments. In their study, participants were presented
with pairs of values, and asked which value was more
important to them in each pair, and they rated the
importance of each value. Moreover, participants
were asked to what extent the values in each pair
shared a similar meaning. Then, the authors assessed
whether the discrepancy in importance attributed to
each pair of values was related to their perceived
semantic relatedness, finding a significant association
(r¼.26, p< .001). Despite the modest correlation,
Pakizeh et al.’s research provided the first association
between importance ratings and conceptual
similarity.
Therefore, the use of conceptual similarities can
help to elucidate value–behavior relations. Values
may have low or high conceptual similarity, while
having low or high motivational force, that is, simi-
larity and personal relevance are distinct. These dif-
ferences between conceptual similarities and
importance can also occur when comparing values
with behavioral instantiations. This raises several
questions: When we map these conceptual similarities
between behavioral instantiations of values, will we
obtain a structure that resembles Schwartz’s value
model? If not replicated, this finding would show
that even the most closely related behaviors have
determinants (e.g., goals, abilities) that are not iso-
metric with the motivations underpinning values in
the model (perhaps due to other factors besides
values that shape behavior). This would be consistent
with Bardi and Schwartz’s (2003) suggestion that
there may be systematic exceptions to the pattern pre-
dicted by Schwartz’s model. These exceptions would
occur because of the stronger value–behavior rela-
tions exhibited by some types of values (e.g., tradi-
tion, stimulation) than for other value types (e.g.,
benevolence, security). In contrast, if behaviors that
are prototypical of values exhibit the same circular
pattern, this would support the model and suggest
that any departures from sinusoidal wave patterns
in value–behavior relations stem largely from atypi-
cality in the mental representation of the particular
behaviors within the values.
4 European Journal of Personality 0(0)
The Present Research
The present research assessed similarities between
mental representations of values and behaviors,
using similarity ratings. This approach allowed us to
estimate spatial representation of behavioral instan-
tiations alongside the spatial representation of values
in Schwartz’s space (see Figure 1). To develop these
spatial representations, we used multidimensional
scaling (MDS) to map values and behaviors. In
MDS plots, items positioned more closely together
can be interpreted as more similar, whereas those
positioned further apart are more dissimilar (Hout
et al., 2013). Thus, in addition to providing a psycho-
logical model of similarity, MDS allowed us to visu-
alize the similarity relations between instances by
reducing potentially complex similarity data to
Cartesian spatial representations.
To assess the structural convergence between the
behavioral instantiations of values and the values
themselves, we first conducted two pilot studies to
generate the behavioral exemplars and test their
value representativeness. Next, we employed different
methodologies to spatially map the behavioral instan-
tiations across three empirical studies. We examined
participants’ perceptions of the similarities between
behavioral instantiations of values with Schwartz’s
10 value types (Study 1), Schwartz’s four higher
order values (Study 2), and other behavioral instan-
tiations of values (Study 3).
The combined sample size across all three studies
was 367 participants. This sample size enabled us to
obtain relatively precise estimates of the similarity
relations in each study.1 To avoid confounding cul-
tural difference between different experiments when
interpreting the behaviors (Hanel et al., 2018), partic-
ipants from all three studies were British individuals
living in the UK. They were recruited online via
Prolific Academic (an online participant recruitment
tool; https://www.prolific.co/). Each participant took
part only in one study.
Pilot Studies: Creating Behavioral Instantiations
of Values
In our first pilot study, 104 participants from the gen-
eral public (65 women and 39 men; Mage¼ 36.14,
SDage¼ 12.63) were asked to create hypothetical sit-
uations/behaviors for each of the 10 value types from
Schwartz’s model, following a previously developed
methodology (Hanel et al., 2018, Study 1). After
being briefly introduced to the concept of human
values, we asked participants to give two examples
of hypothetical situations in which they considered
the value types from Schwartz theory (e.g.,
Benevolence, Universalism, Power) to be relevant.
The situations were composed of different people
(participants), actions (behaviors), and places (locali-
ty). The data were then analyzed using IRAMUTEQ,
free software that performs content analysis that is
coded in R and Python (https://sourceforge.net/proj
ects/iramuteq; Ratinaud, 2009). Through frequency
analyses (e.g., Frequency of Active Words,
Similarities Analysis, Word Cloud) and with the
help of experts in human values, we adapted partic-
ipants’ most typical answers to create a list of mean-
ingful behavioral instantiations of values. Based on
the most typical answers and following the experts’
suggestions, we selected the 40 best fitting behaviors
(four for each of the 10 value types). Many more
behaviors could have been generated and used
within this research due to varied answers.
However, to keep the length manageable for partici-
pants when doing the direct similarity judgments, we
decided to stick with this specific number of behav-
ioral instantiations of values.
In the second pilot study, 105 participants (51
women and 54 men; Mage¼ 35.87, SDage¼ 11.85)
were asked to rate the extent to which the behavioral
instantiations of values related to their respective
value types, from 0% (not at all) to 100% (extremely).
We presented the list of forty behaviors instances
(four per value type). Before completing the task,
participants were briefly introduced to the concept
of human values. In addition to the behaviors used,
nine arbitrary situations that we generated (e.g.,
“feeling depressed”) were assigned to random value
types to avoid eliciting routinely high automatic
agreement with items. All but one of the behavioral
instantiations of values were described as more than
50% related to their respective value types (see
Table 1). The only exception was “Children eating
healthy food at home,” which was described as 35%
related to the value type for which it was generated,
conformity. Together, this validates our selection of
behaviors. Also, as expected, participants indicated
that the nine arbitrary behavioral instantiations of
values assigned to random value types were less
than 50% relevant to those values.
Study 1
Suppose the behaviors obtained from our pilot
research are mentally related to Schwartz’s model’s
underlying motives and values. In that case, the spa-
tial representations of behaviors derived from MDS
should correspond with the location of the putatively
relevant values in Schwartz’s model. Study 1 assessed
the relations between the 40 behavioral instantiations
of values (see Table 1) and Schwartz’s 10 value types.
Although uncommon, this type of approach compar-
ing values (and, in this case, behavioral instantiations
of values) to value types is not novel in the literature.
This relatively new approach to comparing values
(and behavioral instantiations of values) was used
by Coelho et al. (2019). They assessed whether value
items could be directly compared to value types and
whether these conceptual comparisons would
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replicate Schwartz’s structure through conceptual
representations of values. Their findings provided
support to the value model. Our study tested whether
the spatial representation for behavioral instantia-
tions of values replicates Schwartz’s (1992) value
space. Behaviors that were judged as similar to one
value are near each other in the plot.
Method
Participants. One hundred twenty-five participants
completed an online survey. Two participants failed
the instructional manipulation check (IMC) twice
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and/or two test items
spread across the main task and were excluded. Of
Table 1. Rated Degree of Relevance Between the Situations\Behaviors and the Value Types.
Situations CODE Mean SD
Benevolence (x¼ .56)
Nurses taking care of patients in hospital BE1 80.60 15.30
Mothers looking after their children at home BE2 80.60 20.68
Volunteers providing food for homeless people in the community BE3 77.68 20.95
Workers helping each other at workplace BE4 74.01 17.79
Universalism (x¼ .58)
Environmentalists planting new trees in the forest UN1 80.82 18.51
Social workers helping people in their local communities UN2 75.38 18.20
Zookeepers taking care of animals UN3 71.55 20.73
Teachers helping students at school UN4 60.66 25.25
Self-direction (x¼ .59)
Artists creating a new painting design SD1 83.42 13.77
Authors writing a new book SD2 81.15 15.19
Children drawing a picture at home SD3 76.70 17.40
Students learning at school SD4 57.21 24.96
Stimulation (x¼ .65)
Skydivers jumping from a plane ST1 91.24 11.14
Adventurers climbing a mountain ST2 86.21 14.79
Children playing at the park ST3 72.26 21.02
Athletes running on a track ST4 67.22 21.30
Hedonism (x¼ .75)
People going to a club or beach HE1 73.78 22.95
Gamers playing at home HE2 72.28 23.43
Teenagers having a drink in a pub HE3 68.50 26.38
People eating at a restaurant HE4 64.71 22.64
Achievement (x¼ .64)
Athletes winning the Olympics AC1 90.01 13.33
Students graduating from university AC2 87.56 12.69
Employees getting a promotion at work AC3 84.28 13.95
Teachers accomplishing their duties at school AC4 71.61 18.19
Power (x¼ .65)
Prime-ministers or presidents making decisions at parliament PO1 84.55 15.87
Politicians giving speeches in town halls PO2 72.30 18.82
Managers chairing a meeting at the workplace PO3 69.04 20.35
Teachers disciplining students at school PO4 67.26 23.17
Security (x¼ .73)
Police officers arresting criminals in the streets SE1 85.47 13.11
Police officers patrolling the streets SE2 84.94 13.43
Parents taking care of their children at home SE3 78.68 19.10
Security guards locking doors in a bank SE4 75.28 20.92
Tradition (x¼ .64)
Couples getting married at church TR1 82.97 17.22
Religious people praying at home TR2 81.42 17.03
Priests giving sermons at church TR3 79.99 19.41
Individuals visiting family at home TR4 67.64 21.93
Conformity (x¼ .61)
Students following a dress-code at school CO1 73.88 22.67
Prisoners following prison rules CO2 72.89 25.64
Workers respecting colleagues CO3 65.49 24.68
Children eating healthy food at home CO4 34.93 28.53
Note: x¼McDonald’s omega.
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the remaining 123 participants, 54 were men (43.9%)
and 69 women (56.1%), with a mean age of 38.93
(SD¼ 11.32).
Material and Procedure. Participants were briefly intro-
duced to human values. Next, they were asked to rate
the similarity between 40 instantiations (e.g.,
Adventurers climbing a mountain; Police officers
patrolling the streets) and Schwartz’s (1992) 10 value
types (e.g., universalism, hedonism). Participants rated
the similarity of each pair using a slider scale from
0% (not at all) to 100% (extremely). To avoid bore-
dom and fatigue, participants only rated 200 out of
the 400 possible comparisons. These 200 pairs were
randomly assigned to the participants. This way, all
pairs were rated a similar number of times across
participants.
Results and Discussion
MDS Methodology. First, we calculated the mean simi-
larity ratings of all 400 comparisons. Next, we per-
formed an ordinal MDS using the PROXSCAL
algorithm in SPSS. This algorithm creates a geometric
representation of the similarity data in terms of the
proximity between the items (Hout et al., 2013). We
selected the Torgerson configuration (also known as
classical MDS) as the initial configuration, creating a
two-dimensional representation of high-dimensional
data (Brandes & Pich, 2007). We used Stress-I to
assess the model fit (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-
Anastasova, 2009), following Sturrock and Rocha’s
(2000) suggested cut-offs. Lower values indicate a
better model fit. For this study, when 40 behaviors
are spread across a two-dimensional plane, a cut-off
lower than .35 is recommended. The results indicate a
good model fit (Stress-I¼ .13).
We assessed how closely this spatial representation
of behaviors aligned with the representation of values
in Schwartz’s model, using R software (R
Development Core Team, 2015). To assess this fit,
we used Procrustes analysis (“Protest”; Peres-Neto
& Jackson, 2001), which tests the degree to which
two sets of points align. Specifically, Protest com-
pares two ordinations using symmetric Procrustes
analysis (Oksanen, 2015) by minimizing the sum-
of-squared differences through rescaling the
configurations to a common size, mirror reflecting (if
necessary), and rotating (Peres-Neto & Jackson, 2001).
Protest is also known as an analysis of congruence
(Oksanen, 2015). In other words, using Protest in
our studies enabled us to assess the alignment of the
behavioral spatial arrangements in our data with the
theoretical spatial arrangement of values from
Schwartz’s model. The “coefficient of agreement”
between the data and the hypothetical structure of
Schwartz’s model is quantified by an effect size sim-
ilar to a correlation coefficient, which can be labeled
rm (as used in Coelho et al., 2019) and by whether it is
statistically significant (Oksanen, 2015). The larger
the rm, the better the fit. If rm is statistically significant
(i.e., p< .05), this implies agreement between the data
and hypothetical structure. We specified Schwartz’s
model (i.e., the target structure) by creating a hypo-
thetical ideal structure with the four higher order
value types placed along a circle, 90 apart from
each other. For example, self-enhancement values
were initially placed at the bottom, x¼ 0, y¼0.5.
In contrast, self-transcendence values were expected
to be placed at the top, x¼ 0, y¼ 0.5 (the R-code can
be found in the online Supplementary Materials, see
the file “Protest analsis.R”). Another caveat is that we
measured agreement by a high standard, because the
dimensions were treated as orthogonal and the instan-
ces perfectly positioned in relation to the dimension.
A more flexible approach may have shown higher fit.
Nonetheless, our approach enabled a consistent test
in line with a perfect circular model. The results indi-
cated a good match between the spatial representa-
tions of instantiations and the ideal structure of
Schwartz’s model (rm¼ .79, p< .001).
We used the convex hull (dashed lines connecting
the behaviors) to facilitate data interpretation by pro-
viding the smallest convex set of behaviors for each
higher order value from Schwartz’s model. As shown
in Figure 2, most behavioral instantiations of values
from the same higher order value were clustered
together. In addition, the putatively opposing behav-
iors (based on the values from which they were
derived) were in opposite positions on their respective
dimensions, easily seen in the conservation versus
openness to change dimensions. However, the
spread of the behaviors derived from self-
enhancement values is large. Some of them visually
oppose each other in the spatial set (AC1–PO4),
rather than being adjacent as in Schwartz’s (1992)
model. Also, some behaviors derived from self-
transcendence values were mixed with conservation
behaviors, including “Teachers helping students at
school” (UN4) and “Mothers looking after their chil-
dren at home” (BE2).
In sum, most of the behavioral instantiations were
clustered with behaviors from the same value type,
indicating that behaviors derived from values mirror
the structure of the values when directly compared to
them. However, the abstractness of values and the
potential for behaviors to express different values at
once (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2013) also
led us to expect some deviations. The deviations that
we observed illustrate this. For example, “Teachers
helping students at school” was generated in response
to a self-transcendence value type (Universalism;
UNI04). However, the content of the value can also
imply, for instance, conservation motives because it
involves teachers doing their jobs. This dual relevance
might help to explain why this specific behavior
mixed with conservation across the two-dimensional
space. The varied instances of intermixing between
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the behaviors and other values show that even the
behaviors generated to represent particular values
can represent other value types.
Study 2
In Study 2, we asked participants to place the behav-
iors directly along Schwartz’s two dimensions, self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness
versus conservation. Behavioral instantiations of
values placed closer to one end of the dimension indi-
cated that it is more characteristic of this end. This
method is helpful because the two dimensions are
essential core features of the model, reflecting the
contrasting motives. In addition, the method is a
more direct assessment of the value space in
Schwartz’s mode insofar as it directly plots partici-
pants’ responses on the two dimensions, rather than
indirectly inferring their positions on these dimen-
sions via MDS using similarity ratings.
Method
Participants. Participants were 113 individuals, includ-
ing 65 women (57.5%) and 48 men (42.5%), with a
mean age of 37.48 (SD¼ 12.21). No participant failed
the IMC (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and/or test items.
Material and Procedure. Before completing the task,
participants were presented with a one-paragraph
summary of Schwartz’s (1992) theory. This summary
explained how the two value dimensions are specified.
Next, participants were asked to position the behav-
iors between opposing ends on each of his two dimen-
sions. Participants used a 9-point bipolar scale, with
the opposing higher order value domains identified at
each end. Behaviors that participants placed closer to
one end should be more representative of that end of
the dimension. If they judged the behavior as not rep-
resentative of either end of a dimension, they could
select the middle point of the scale.
Results and Discussion
The spatial representation (Figure 3) was plotted
from the means of the behavioral instantiations for
both dimensions, with self-enhancement versus self-
transcendence on the x-axis and openness to change
versus conservation on the y-axis. This method
allows the coordinates of behavioral instantiations
in the model to be directly checked without needing
any optimization of fit. Behavioral instantiations of
values originating from self-enhancement values
should be on the left of the x-axis, while those origi-
nated from self-transcendence values should be on the
right. Similarly, the openness to change behaviors
should appear at the top of the y-axis, with conserva-
tion behaviors at the bottom.
The results can be seen in Figure 3. First, five
behaviors (AC1, AC2, AC3, PO2, and PO3) promot-
ing self-enhancement values were more likely to occur
on the self-enhancement end of the self-enhancement-
to-self-transcendence value dimension than on the
other end, which comprised all the behaviors promot-
ing self-transcendence values. Second, most of the
behaviors promoting conservation values were more
likely to occur on the conservation end of the
conservation-to-openness dimension than on the
other end, which comprised most behaviors promot-
ing openness values.
However, the positions of the behaviors only
partly resembled Schwartz’s model, despite the signif-
icant match to Schwartz’s hypothetical configuration
(rm¼ .71, p< .001). All the openness behaviors were
strongly associated with the self-enhancement pole,
with associations even higher than the self-
Figure 2. MDS Structure for Similarities Ratings Between Behaviors and Value Types (Study 1). Convex hull: dashed lines connecting
behavior groups. AC: Achievement, BE: Benevolence, CO: Conformity, HE: Hedonism, PO: Power, SD: Self-direction, SE: Security,
ST: Stimulation, TR: Tradition, UN: Universalism.2
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enhancement behaviors themselves. These higher
associations to an adjacent pole also happened with
most of the self-transcendence behaviors, which were
associated with the openness pole. Within the circum-
plex model, their behaviors are expected to be near
their original value types. However, stronger associa-
tion to the adjacent value types instead of the original
values from which they were derived indicates that
they have multiple underlying motivations. Thus,
while from Schwartz’s theoretical perspective, the
two dimensions are orthogonal, the results indicate
that behavioral instantiations of values of openness
and self-transcendence both express putatively unre-
lated value-motives.
The deviations of the behavioral instantiations of
values from the model included six behaviors posi-
tioned at the opposite end of the dimension contain-
ing the values from which the behaviors were derived.
Three behaviors from the self-enhancement end were
positioned slightly toward self-transcendence, and
three conservation behaviors were positioned
toward openness to change. Thus, individuals might
think of the behaviors through different motivations.
For example, “Teachers disciplining students at
school” (PO4) was derived as an example of self-
enhancement values. However, one can interpret
this behavior as supporting a self-transcendence moti-
vation, seeing this discipline as something that aims to
help the students, instead of seeing it as a demonstra-
tion of power or authority from the teacher. Another
example is “Children eating healthy food at home”
(CO4), which was not well related to its respective
value type, conservation, in Study 2. Despite the der-
ivation of this behavior from conservation, one can
also think of this behavior as an opportunity to try
new and alternative types of food, thereby pursuing
openness to experience. Other similar instances of
behaviors near alternative values were “Prime-minis-
ters or presidents making decisions at parliament”
(PO1), “Teachers accomplishing their duties at
school” (AC4), “Workers respecting colleagues”
(CO3), and “Individuals visiting family at home”
(TR4). These instances demonstrate the inherent
links between many behaviors and multiple values,
even when focusing on behaviors that are judged (in
our pilot samples) as typical of a particular value.
Study 3
The aim of Study 3 was to examine the relations
among behaviors through similarity judgments
between pairs of behaviors. Comparing behaviors
with other behaviors allows a direct assessment of
whether they result in the same motivational space
as values, even without participants’ explicit consid-
erations of values.
Method
Participants. Participants were 135 individuals. Four
participants were excluded because they failed the
IMC twice (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) and/or two
test items. Thus, the final sample consisted of 131
participants with a mean age of 39.48 (SD¼ 11.43),
including 71 women (54.2%) and 60 men (45.8%).
Material and Procedure. Participants were asked to rate
the extent to which pairs of the 40 behaviors are sim-
ilar to one another, using a slider scale ranging from
0% (not at all) to 100% (extremely). An example of
the task can be seen in the Supplementary Material
(OSM.docx). Because the total number of pairs was
large (780), each participant did only a randomly
selected one-third of them (260).
Results and Discussion
An ordinal MDS was performed using the
PROXSCAL algorithm and Torgerson configuration.
Figure 3. Behaviors Placed Among Schwartz’s Dimensions (Study 2).3
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Once again, the results indicated a good model fit,
Stress-I¼ .23, which is lower than the recommended
level of .35 (Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). The behavioral
structure (Figure 4) aligned with Schwartz’s model
(rm¼ .59, p< .001).
The behaviors exhibited some congruence with
Schwartz’s spatial representation of values. For
instance, openness to change and conservation (i.e.,
the gray triangles and yellow diamonds) were at
opposite sides of the space. However, the behaviors
were not always consistent with the model. In partic-
ular, self-transcendence behaviors were mixed with
both conservation and self-enhancement in a position
near the middle of the plane. This mixing may have
occurred because these two higher order values have a
social focus, representing how individuals socially
relate to and affect others (e.g., Schwartz et al.,
2012). Despite this deviation, the self-transcendence
behaviors were more clustered than the other three
higher order behavioral instantiations of values, indi-
cating a greater similarity between behaviors in this
value domain.
There are viable alternative explanations for the
obtained behavior mapping—in addition to the moti-
vations encompassed within Schwartz’s model.
Consistent with the self-other distinction in
Schwartz’s model, most of the behaviors that are
positioned at the right of the spatial representation
showed a higher focus on personal gains (e.g.,
“People eating at a restaurant,” “Teenagers having
a drink in a pub”), whereas the behaviors more to
the left of the space were more social in focus (e.g.,
“police officers arresting criminals,” “zookeepers
taking care of animals”). The behaviors may also
have differed in familiarity to the participants. The
behaviors on the left refer to specific roles not
necessarily performed by the participants (“Security
guards locking doors in a bank,” “prime-ministers
making decisions”). In contrast, the ones from the
right are more likely to be performed frequently
(“Gamers playing at home,” “People going to a
club or beach”). These differences in focus and famil-
iarity across the space may explain these differences in
alignment between the behaviors and the values from
which they were derived.
In summary, when making direct comparisons
between value-derived behaviors without explicitly
invoking values, the data again broadly aligned with
Schwartz’s model, although the fit was not as strong
as in our Studies 1 and 2, in which behaviors were
compared with values. Although openness to change
and conservation behaviors were in opposing ends of
the space, self-transcendence behaviors were in
the center, mixed with conservation and self-
enhancement behaviors. The mental representation of
these behaviors may be affected by their focus (social
or personal) or their familiarity, among other factors.
General Discussion
Across three studies, we compared spatial representa-
tions of value-related behaviors that were explicitly
derived from people’s mental representations of the
values via similarity judgment to the spatial positions
of values in Schwartz’s model of human values. The
key purpose of this research was to assess whether
similarly derived spatial representations of value-
related behaviors are in a common space with the
values themselves, both accounted for by Schwartz’s
model. We therefore assessed the relations between
human values and behavioral instantiations of
values through various tasks using direct judgments
Figure 4. MDS Spatial Representation of Behavior Similarities (Study 3).4
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of conceptual similarities. These tasks provided the
first spatial representations that capture how people
interpret and understand behaviors in relation to
values. The tasks also enabled us to evaluate whether
these mental representations of the behaviors are spa-
tially represented in a way that aligns the spatial posi-
tions of values in Schwartz’s model, as these
behaviors putatively expressed the motivations under-
pinning the values. We assessed whether the mental
representations of the behaviors are consistent with
the values and motivation dimensions in Schwartz’s
model, as the behaviors originated from the same
values.
Mapping Behavioral Instantiations
Studies 1 and 2 made direct comparisons between
values and behaviors using different methods. In
Study 1, participants rated the similarities between
behaviors and all 10 lower order value types in
Schwartz’s model. The resulting spatial representa-
tion showed substantial congruence with Schwartz’s
model, with most behaviors clustered together with
behaviors from the same higher order value. Also,
the map visually reproduced aspects of motivational
agreement versus conflict, with conservation
opposing openness to change behaviors and
self-enhancement opposing self-transcendence.
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that self-
enhancement behaviors were widely spread across
the two-dimensional space, indicating more variation
in the way individuals interpret these behaviors, asso-
ciating them with other value types. Another
interesting finding is that behaviors derived from
self-transcendence values were mixed with behaviors
derived from conservation values. This mixing might
have occurred because of the social focus of these two
higher order values (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012). For
instance, consider the behavior “Nurses taking care of
patients in hospital” (BE1). The underlying motiva-
tion is benevolent, because the behavior represents
professionals taking care of other people. However,
it can also be interpreted as individuals trying to
maintain stability and security and improve people’s
health, which taps into conservation motivations.
The spatial representation from Study 2 also
showed substantial agreement with Schwartz’s
model. One interesting finding is that both openness
to change and self-transcendence behaviors were
highly clustered, indicating strong congruence
between their respective behavioral instantiations
of values. In contrast, conservation and self-
enhancement behaviors were more heterogenous
and were spread across the plane, and even sometimes
occur at the opposite end of the space. One possible
explanation relies on the motivations people attribute
to these behaviors. For example, consider the behav-
ior “Prime-ministers making decisions at parliament”
(PO1), which was rated in Study 1 as a good example
of power. This behavior can also be considered to
express concerns for the welfare of others and there-
fore is an alternative example of self-transcendence
behavior.
The multiple motivations potentially underlying
the behaviors made it relevant to consider the struc-
ture revealed by comparing the value-instantiating
behaviors to one another, without any direct refer-
ence to values. In Study 3, we removed the explicit
influence of values, and performed direct compari-
sons of similarity between all 40 behaviors. It was
an open question whether this would generate a new
spatial representation or replicate Schwartz’s
structure. The results showed some congruence with
Schwartz’s model and some differences. Conservation
and openness to change behaviors were at opposite
sides of the spatial representation, agreeing with the
model. However, self-transcendence behaviors were
positioned close to the center of the spatial represen-
tation, mixing with self-enhancement and conserva-
tion behaviors, so not fully agreeing with the model.
This, again, can be understood when assessing the
content of these studies. For instance, “Teachers
helping students at school” (UN4) and “Teachers
accomplishing their duties at school” (AC4), which
are behaviors from opposite sides in the self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension.
While universalism represents the “understanding,
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the wel-
fare of all people and for nature” (Schwartz, 1992,
p. 12), achievement is characterized by “personal suc-
cess through demonstrating competence according to
social standards” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 8). However,
despite their implied motivational differences from
Schwarz’s model, the behaviors are closely related.
Therefore, although there were notable deviations
from Schwartz’s value model, the behavioral instan-
tiations were broadly consistent with it.
However, Study 3 also revealed the importance of
considering diverse ways in which behaviors vary.
The behaviors more to the left of the spatial represen-
tations corresponded to a higher social focus and
were less frequent examples of daily behaviors. On
the other hand, the behaviors more to the right of
the spatial representation had a more personal focus
and are more typical of daily life. Given the way our
pilot study generated these behaviors, the reasons for
this difference may be a natural consequence of how
people mentally construct the behaviors relevant to
the values.
Furthermore, we discuss why certain behaviors
consistently deviated across studies from other behav-
iors initially thought to express the same value. For
instance, consider the behavior “Teachers disciplining
students at school” (PO4). This behavior originated
from power and was considered a good example of
that value type in our pilot studies. However, this
behavior was positioned among conservation behav-
iors (Studies 1 and 3) and positioned on the self-
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enhancement side close to conservation (Study 2). We
believe that this deviance arose because the behavior
can be understood in different ways. For example,
disciplining can be easily interpreted as a demonstra-
tion of power, as it shows authority over individuals.
Within a specific context, such as school, however,
disciplining can be understood as an example of
order or self-restraint, which are conservation
values. Therefore, such deviations across studies fur-
ther demonstrate the importance of assessing the
motivation of behavior across methods. One behavior
or instantiation can be directly extracted from a
value, be considered a good example and still be
more associated with behaviors derived from other
values, suggesting that the underlying motivation of
behaviors can vary.
One interesting additional finding is that the fit of
the behaviors to the structure of Schwartz’s model
varied across studies. When participants compared
the behaviors directly with the 10 value types, the
resulting fit with Schwartz’s model was highest
(Study 1; rm¼ .79). When the behaviors were com-
pared with the higher order dimensions, the fit was
lower (Study 2; rm¼ .71). Finally, when behaviors
were compared among each other, the fit was lowest
(Study 3; rm¼ .59). Thus, even though all three
models significantly congruent with Schwartz’s
model, there were differences in the degree of
agreement.
This raises the questions on whether the mental
representation of value instantiations in relation to
the lower order value domains better isolates the
motivational relations predicted by Schwartz’s
model than does the mental representation of value
instantiations in relation the higher order domains or
specific behaviors. Comparison to the lower order
value types may allow participants to differentiate
between the underlying motivation of each behavior
more clearly. For example, in Study 1, participants
contrasted the behavior with more specific value
types such as benevolence, which was described in
the task as “Preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent per-
sonal contact.” In contrast, in Study 2, participants
contrasted behaviors with higher order value types
such as self-transcendence, which is described in the
task as concern “with enhancement of others and
transcendence of selfish interests” (Schwartz, 1992,
p. 15). Finally, when behaviors are compared
among each other, as done in Study 3, the many
underlying motivations of each behavior may result
in a noisier outcome because people might attribute
different underlying mechanisms to each behavior (cf.
Hanel et al., 2018). Comparison to lower order value
types may be the optimal level of analysis for pulling
out the motivational conflicts suggested by
Schwartz’s model, since they present more specific
core characteristics, enabling individuals to distin-
guish better between slightly different underlying
motivations of similar behaviors. Of course, one rel-
evant caveat is that we applied a visual method of
generating the mental representations of value instan-
tiations in relation to the higher order values in Study
2 (instead of using MDS), and it would be worthwhile
for future research to check whether an MDS format
also yields lower fit to the higher order types than to
the lower order types.
Finally, to provide further support for our find-
ings, we visualized how the data from our studies
are structured using heatmaps (see .xlsx files) and
cluster analyses (see Cluster Analysis.docx). Both
approaches replicated the findings we obtained
using MDS. The behaviors that were closer in the
two-dimensional plots presented above revealed
higher degrees of similarities in the heatmaps and
were grouped in the cluster analyses.
Is Schwartz’s Structure Replicated?
The findings helped to reveal many of the subtle com-
plexities that should be considered when tackling
questions about the role of values in human social
cognition and behavior. In the cognitive literature,
conceptual categorization is frequently interpreted
to occur based on the features that compose the con-
cepts, grouping new items to similar old ones (e.g.,
Hahn & Chater, 1997). This process can happen in
different ways because these classifications are based
on personal experiences and interpretations. For
example, some people might classify different ani-
mals, such as cats, tigers, dogs, and wolves, as types
of felines and canines, while others might classify
them as pets and wild animals. By comparison,
values are relatively abstract concepts and more
fluid in construal, and these complexities appear
when using conceptual categorizations of behavioral
instantiations that were directly originated from
values. In light of this fluidity, it is remarkable that
people can map these abstract concepts in systematic
ways that reflect extant assumptions about their moti-
vational relations. In other words, despite the tremen-
dous range of behaviors that may relate to values,
there are core characteristics that enable people to
categorize them in ways that reflect their putative
motivational congruences and incongruences. That
we observed various departures from this alignment
with Schwartz’s model neither refutes the circular
model of values nor the feasibility of linking behav-
iors to values. The results of our research suggest that
behavioral instantiations of values are represented in
a similar way to the values themselves. If people were
not taking the behaviors’ underlying motivations into
account, a behavioral spatial representation that
aligns with Schwartz’s value model would seem
unlikely.
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Limitations
One key consideration is the relation between similar-
ity judgments and importance ratings. To judge the
importance of different objects or assess their similar-
ities, people operate under assumptions of what these
judgments represent. Therefore, the similarity judg-
ments depend on individual knowledge, which may
relate very differently to judgments of importance.
Imagine, for instance, that an individual, disappoint-
ed with their religion, decided to abandon it. This
change is likely to lower their endorsement of tradi-
tion values. However, when presented with similarity
judgments between these values and behaviors such as
“Couples getting married at church” (TR1) and
“Priests giving sermons at church” (TR3), it is likely
that they will attribute a high similarity, because of
the content of these values and behaviors, but this is
likely to be independent of their value endorsements
(i.e., whether tradition is important or not). Hence,
the exact nature of the relations between similarity
judgments and importance ratings still begs further
analysis. Prior research (Maio & Olson, 1998) has
suggested that the cognitive underpinning of values
is weak, which could raise questions about whether
the structures found in our studies, using similarity
judgments, are related to value importance in a sys-
tematic manner. Suppose a participant rates the value
of equality as very important to them. In that case,
they might want to rate broad-mindedness or social
justice as very important, because they are similar at
the system level, and they would like to appear con-
sistent. However, the instantiations of equality that
the participant brings to mind may or may not suit
this convergence in importance ratings, depending on
whether or not the instantiations support these addi-
tional values. This interplay between value impor-
tance and the role of value instantiations is an
important additional avenue for future research.
Moreover, another question that can be raised
concerns the number of participants in our studies,
ranging from 113 to 131. Although a higher number
is desired, the samples were restricted to these num-
bers because of limited resources. However, the fact
that the findings are overall consistent across studies
indicates that the sample sizes were sufficient. Also,
the stress values across our studies suggest that the
samples were large enough for the MDS to find a
spatial solution that represented the data well.
Future Studies
Our research is only the first step in rigorously map-
ping the connections of behavioral instantiations of
values to the putatively relevant values. There are
cross-cultural differences in how people endorse and
instantiate different values (e.g., Coelho et al., 2019;
Hanel, 2016; Hanel et al., 2018). Future research
needs to consider the impact of differences between
behaviors generated as exemplars of distinct values in
different cultures. This should include applying the
methods we have used here in different nations and
cataloguing different attributes of behaviors (e.g.,
actor, context, time) for different values. Such efforts
will help to assess the extent to which the alignments
and departures from Schwartz’s model represent sys-
tematic, universal variations or context-specific and
behavior-specific effects. However, given the exten-
sive cross-cultural similarities in value importance rat-
ings (Hanel et al., 2019; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001),
value structure (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Sagiv,
1995; Schwartz et al., 2012), and some similarities in
value instantiations (Hanel et al., 2018), we expect
that our findings will be replicated cross-culturally.
Moreover, another possible direction for future
studies is to begin modeling vital individual differen-
ces in mental representations of values. For instance,
one person might interpret a medic’s daily actions as
associated with self-transcendence motivations
because of the intentions to help other individuals.
However, some people may interpret these actions
as self-enhancement motivated, as a way to improve
the medic’s professional skills or to get more money
from the patients. This difference in a general benev-
olent system of behavior attribution versus self-
enhancing system of behavior attribution may alter
how values are conceived and the behaviors that are
brought to bear on the values.
It would also be useful for future research to con-
sider whether importance judgments influence simi-
larity judgments. To make comparisons regarding
the similarities of items, people are subject to a cog-
nitive understanding of the items. They might also be
influenced by their subjective evaluations of the per-
sonal significance or importance of the items, partic-
ularly in the case of values and relevant behaviors.
However, the exact nature of the relations between
similarity judgments and importance ratings is still
only partly clarified. In prior research, Pakizeh et al.
(2007) attempted to assess how semantic relatedness
and importance ratings of values were related to each
other. They found a significant, but modest, associa-
tion (r¼.26, p< .001). If importance had a major
influence on similarities judgments, we would expect
higher associations between them. Nevertheless, the
interaction between these components remains a
matter for future study.
Finally, the approach used in our research—asking
individuals of a given culture to list typical behaviors
of a set of values—can also elicit typical behaviors
that threaten a value. For example, one individual
to whom freedom is very important may see the
need to stay at home during lockdown restrictions
as a threat to this value. Thus, these other types of
instantiations could be assessed in future research,
attempting to visualize whether these value threaten-
ing behaviors might also present similar associations
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(although, likely to be negative) to the motivational
circle of values.
Conclusion
In summary, our findings help to address a frequent
problem in research on value–behavior relations.
Most studies simply assume a priori that a behavior
has a connection to a value or set of values. There is
rarely any critical examination of the actual degree of
agreement that individuals have in their mental rep-
resentations of values and the behavioral instantia-
tions of them. Our findings illustrate a method for
identifying which behaviors align well with the
values from which they were methodologically
derived and which behaviors align poorly. At the
same time, the results illustrate the need to consider
other factors that may cause values and behavioral
instantiations of values to align with different moti-
vations, including other variables in behavioral cate-
gorization (e.g., frequency, personal relevance) and
individual differences. These insights may help
researchers select value-relevant behaviors in future
studies of value–behavior relations by carefully con-
sidering the values’ mental representations.
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Notes
1. For example, in Study 2, 113 participants judged
the similarity between instantiations and values on
a 9-point bipolar scale (see Study 2 for details).
Assuming an average standard deviation of 1.88 for
the 9-point scale (as found by Coelho et al., 2019 in a
methodological similar study), the 95% confidence
interval across each similarity judgment would be on
average [M 1.96 1.88/sqrt(113), Mþ 1.96 1.88/
sqrt(113)]¼ [M – 0.35, Mþ 0.35]. In other words, the
width of the confidence intervals would be only
0.35þ 0.35¼ 0.70 points on our 9-point scale, which
is fairly narrow.
2–4. Athletes winning the Olympics, AC1; Students gradu-
ating from university, AC2; Employees getting a pro-
motion at work, AC3; Teachers accomplishing their
duties at school, AC4; Nurses taking care of patients
in hospital, BE1; Mothers looking after their children
at home, BE2; Volunteers providing food for homeless
people in the community, BE3; Workers helping each
other at workplace, BE4; Students following a dress-
code at school, CO1; Prisoners following prison rules,
CO2; Workers respecting colleagues, CO3; Children
eating healthy food at home, CO4; People going to a
club or beach, HE1; Gamers playing at home, HE2;
Teenagers having a drink in a pub, HE3; People eating
at a restaurant, HE4; Prime-ministers or presidents
making decisions at parliament, PO1; Politicians
giving speeches in town halls, PO2; Managers chairing
a meeting at the workplace, PO3; Teachers disciplining
students at school, PO4; Artists creating a new paint-
ing design, SD1; Authors writing a new book, SD2;
Children drawing a picture at home, SD3; Students
learning at school, SD4; Police officers arresting crim-
inals in the streets, SE1; Police officers patrolling the
streets, SE2; Parents taking care of their children at
home, SE3; Security guards locking doors in a bank,
SE4; Skydivers jumping from a plane, ST1;
Adventurers climbing a mountain, ST2; Children play-
ing at the park, ST3; Athletes running on a track, ST4;
Couples getting married at church, TR1; Religious
people praying at home, TR2; Priests giving sermons
at church, TR3; Individuals visiting family at home,
TR4; Environmentalists planting new trees in the
forest, UN1; Social workers helping people in their
local communities, UN2; Zookeepers taking care of
animals, UN3; Teachers helping students at school,
UN4.
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